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Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context:
The De'jA vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency
Adjudication
By Margaret H. Taylor*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication (the
Asylum Study), Professors Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag
provide a comprehensive analysis of new data to document
decisional disparities that undermine the fairness of asylum
adjudication. The Asylum Study is an empirical project of
remarkable scope. It examines patterns of asylum decisions at four
different adjudication levels: at the asylum office interview, in
immigration court, on administrative appeal to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA), and on petition for review to the federal
courts of appeals. At each level, the Asylum Study generates
empirical findings to support what we knew mostly by anecdote -
that there are eye-popping disparities in the grant rates of asylum
adjudicators that cannot be explained by the underlying merits of the
cases. I
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. I am grateful to
Chris Coughlin, Jeff Lubbers, David Martin, Hiroshi Motomura, Sid Shapiro, and
Ron Wright for their very helpful comments. I am especially indebted to my former
student Christina L. Boyd, now a Ph.D. candidate in political science and a
graduate student associate in the Center for Empirical Research in the Law at
Washington University St. Louis, for offering her perspective on the design,
methodology, and underlying theories of empirical studies of judicial behavior.
While I have learned from the insights of these colleagues, any mistakes are my
own.
What are we to make of these findings? One could derive an
answer from a variety of perspectives; my response to the Asylum
Study will employ two. First, I will situate the study within a territory
that is noted but not explored by its authors: the work of political
scientists who conduct empirical studies of judicial decision making.
Second, I will examine the Asylum Study through the lens of
administrative law, where we find a deja vu component to its
findings. This essay has a dual purpose: to open a multidisciplinary
window onto the Asylum Study, and to delve into the broader
administrative law context of the intractable problem of decisional
disparities in agency adjudication.
II. OPENING A WINDOW TO POLITICAL SCIENCE
Political scientists have published scores of empirical studies to
explore the impact of extraneous factors, including judge ideology
and gender, on judicial decision making.2 Most of these studies focus
1. A snapshot of the "disconcerting variability" of administrative justice in the
asylum adjudication system is captured in the Asylum Study's findings regarding
applications from China. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G.
Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REv.
295, 303 (2007) [hereinafter Asylum Study]. In one regional asylum office, the
grant rates for applications from China varied from zero to sixty-eight percent.
Sixty percent of the officers in that regional office deviated from their office's mean
for granting applications from China by more than fifty percent. Id. at 321. A
Chinese asylum seeker who appears in immigration court in Atlanta has a seven
percent chance of success on her claim. Nationwide, immigration judges grant
Chinese applications in forty-seven percent of cases. In Orlando, that figure is
seventy-six percent. Id. at 330. When an applicant from China loses at the Board of
Immigration Appeals and seeks a petition for review in the U.S. courts of appeals,
her chance of success varies greatly depending on the circuit where the petition is
heard. From 2003 to 2005, the Fourth Circuit did not remand a single case from
China (i.e., the court never decided in favor of the applicant), while the Ninth
Circuit remanded in thirty-seven percent of cases. Id. at 362.
2. The law review literature is cited in the Asylum Study, supra note 1, at 300-
01 nn.2-7, 303 n.12. The inconsistent findings of twenty-eight empirical studies
assessing whether male and female judges decide cases differently are summarized
in Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, UNTANGLING THE CAUSAL
EFFECTS OF SEX ON JUDGING app. a (April 24, 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/ genderjudging.pdf.
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on Article III courts (most often the Supreme Court), and consider
decisional patterns at a single level of adjudication. These empiricists
have honed the methodology used to study judicial decision making,
and have developed a theoretical framework to explain judicial
behavior. Their work provides a useful perspective to examine the
findings of the Asylum Study.
As an empirical study of judicial behavior, the Asylum Study
breaks no new ground methodologically, and it might be criticized by
empiricists who generally apply more refined multivariate statistical
models to much smaller datasets. The Asylum Study's conclusion that
"the gender of the [immigration] judge had a significant impact on
the likelihood that asylum would be granted, 3 for example, would be
viewed by a dedicated empiricist as problematic because the authors
do not isolate the effect of judge gender.4 The Asylum Study
recognizes this limitation - noting, for example, that "some of the
"gender effect' on asylum decision making may be related to the
different prior work experience of male and female judges"5 - but
does not employ the statistical tools to measure this effect. For this
reason, while the Asylum Study convincingly documents decisional
disparities in asylum adjudication, its analysis of whether judge
ideology and gender are explanatory factors should be considered
preliminary.
This criticism should not, however, obscure the significant
contributions of the Asylum Study. The authors venture into new
territory when they analyze the judicial behavior of adjudicators
within an administrative agency, and when they undertake this
Several of these studies, and their conflicting outcomes, are also noted in the
Asylum Study, supra note 1, at 343-44.
3. Asylum Study, supra note 1, at 342.
4. This criticism is explained in Boyd et al., supra note 2, which posits that
empirical studies of the role of sex in judging reach inconsistent results because the
predominant statistical models - variants of regression analysis - are ill-suited to
establish causal inferences in this context. Id. at 2, 9-12. The authors explain that
because female judges are, on average, more liberal than their male colleagues, the
data are imbalanced. This means that using regression analysis to assess the impact
of sex on voting patterns could lead to misleading results. Id. at 10-12. The authors
instead apply non-parametric matching methodology to test these effects, using a
dataset of sex discrimination suits in the federal circuits, and observe substantial
individual and panel effects. Id. at 14-28.
5. Asylum Study, supra note 1, at 344.
analysis at four levels of adjudication.6 We might wish for more
complete data, and wonder whether the explanations typically offered
to explain the voting behavior of Article III judges hold true in the
decidedly different political context of agency adjudication.
Nevertheless, we now have a well-developed picture of the scope and
patterns of decisional disparities in asylum adjudication. The Asylum
Study prompts us, moreover, to consider whether differently
designed adjudication systems might increase or reduce decisional
disparities.7
The Asylum Study also demonstrates how important it is for
empiricists to understand the legal and procedural context of their
dataset. The substantive expertise of Professors Ramji-Nogales,
Schoenholtz, and Schrag, which has been honed through years of
experience representing asylum seekers (and supervising students
who do the same), is critical to the successful design and
implementation of this study.8 It brought us, for example, useful
ways to control for the variable of nationality differences in caseload
while comparing asylum grant rates across individual adjudicators
and regions.9 I doubt that anyone who lacked the authors' intimate
6. Each level of the study draws asylum claims from a different source and
adjudicates them under different procedures. For this reason, the authors
appropriately do not attempt any cross-level statistical comparisons. We cannot
assess, for example, whether asylum officers who decide cases after an informal
interview on the whole are more generous than immigration judges who preside
over adversarial removal hearings because the pool of claims being adjudicated is
quite different at those two levels. For criticism of a study that attempts this
comparison, see infra note 10.
7. I elaborate on how the structure of agency adjudication might impact
decisional uniformity infra Part II.A. See also Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to
Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REv.
413, 457-62 (2007).
8. This point is difficult to make without getting mired in the technical details
of Appendix I, which explains the methodology the authors employed for selecting
cases at each level of the study. One can note, for example, that all data excludes
Mexican asylum applicants, and that detained asylum applicants are removed, as
much as possible, from the immigration court analysis. Asylum Study, supra note
1, at 312, 395. These exclusions make sense to those well versed in asylum law and
procedure, and they enhance the study's design. But they might not occur to
someone lacking the substantive expertise of the study authors.
9. To control for the variable of nationality differences in caseload, the authors
narrow their dataset by comparing grant rates only for cases of nationals from
Asylee Producing Countries (APCs). These are countries with a significant number
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knowledge of the asylum process could deliver such a detailed and
convincing analysis.' 0
Although it is an impressive study, the Asylum Study does
illustrate a boundary that persists between law professors and
political scientists. Scholars from both disciplines have become
accustomed to sharing the territory of empirical analysis, as
demonstrated by a recent spate of law review articles distilling the
best practices for designing studies and communicating results."
Nevertheless, most of us - legal scholars and political scientists alike
- still do not routinely read each others' work (which is, for the most
part, published in entirely different arenas), and thus miss certain
insights that might be brought to bear when our fields of study
overlap.' 2
of applicants (over 500) and a national grant rate of at least thirty percent before the
asylum office or immigration court in fiscal year 2004. Id. at 311.
10. Another study purporting to explain disparities in asylum adjudication,
published in a public policy journal, is premised on a misunderstanding of asylum
procedures. Ming H. Chen, Explaining Disparities in Asylum Claims, 12 GEO. PUB.
POL'Y REv. 29 (2007). The author of this study apparently did not know that
asylum officers have legal authority to "deny" only those cases where the applicant
is in authorized immigration status. See Asylum Study, supra note 1, at 306 n.22.
Because asylum officers denied, on average, nine percent of cases during her study
period, the study author calculated an average ninety-one percent "grant rate" in
asylum offices. Chen, supra, at 34 figs.2 & 36; cf. Asylum Study, supra note 1, at
314 (finding that most asylum officers grant asylum to nationals of APCs at a rate
between thirty and forty-five percent). Further extrapolating from this incorrect
figure, she then concluded that "asylum officers refer less than 10% of the cases
they adjudicate" to immigration court. Chen, supra, at 41. These startlingly
inaccurate figures prompted the author to examine a mistaken hypothesis: that
asylum officers are far more generous than immigration judges in granting asylum.
Id. at 36. The Asylum Study found no such disparity in the grant rates of asylum
officers and immigration judges.
11. See Lee Epstein et al., On the Effective Communication of the Results of
Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1811 (2006); Lee Epstein et al., On the
Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part II, 60 VAND. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://epstein.law.northwestem.edu/research/communicating .html; Mark A. Hall &
Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 95 CAL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-913336.
12. This point is especially well made in R. Shep Melnick's essay,
Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 245 (1992). See
also Keith Whittington, Crossing Over: Citation of Public Law Faculty in Law
Reviews, Law & Courts, Spring 2004, at 5.
Missing from the Asylum Study, although quite on point to the
authors' analysis, are the theoretical models political scientists have
developed to explain judicial behavior. 13 The Asylum Study posits
that at each level of asylum adjudication, "the outcome of a case
appears to be strongly influenced by the identity or attitude of the
officer or judge to whom it is assigned.' 14 This conclusion mirrors
the attitudinal model of judging, originally developed to explain
Supreme Court voting patterns but more recently expanded to other
realms. The attitudinal model states that judges decide cases (and
especially the close cases) based on their ideologies or attitudes
toward a particular claim - or, stated more simply, that judges vote
their values. 5 This claim is fully theorized and tested by empirical
analysis; it also is challenged to a degree by an alternate theory
known as the strategic model of judging. The strategic model accepts
that judges are inclined to vote consistent with their ideological
preferences, but stresses that they are also subject to compromises
imposed by collegial decision making and a number of political
constraints. 16 This theory also seems reflected in the Asylum Study -
most notably in the section that correlates certain interventions from
the Attorney General with a steep drop in BIA decisions favorable to
asylum applicants.' 7 More generally, the strategic model, with its
emphasis on the political context of judging, seems an especially apt
13. These models are generally missing from legal scholarship, which labors to
"build a wall of separation between law and politics." Barry Friedman, The Politics
of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REv. 257, 267 (2005). Professor Friedman's article
is an important effort to dismantle this wall.
14. Asylum Study, supra note 1, at 302.
15. The classic work on the attitudinal model is Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J.
Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (2002). See also
Virginia Hettinger et al., Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of
Dissenting Behavior on the US. Courts of Appeals, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 123 (2004);
Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A
Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REv. 301 (2004).
16. Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make (1998); Lee
Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY
L.J. 583 (2001). For a critique of political science's positive approach to judicial
behavior, see Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 385
(2007) ("The law has independent normative force that cannot be reduced to purely
strategic explanations.").
17. Asylum Study, supra note 1, at 355-61.
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theory to employ in a study of agency adjudicators who decide cases
subject to political and policy controls.
A full elaboration and application of these theories is beyond the
scope of this response (and, to be fair, can also be seen as beyond the
scope of the Asylum Study). Nevertheless, I hope that by noting the
relevance of these models I might prompt legal scholars and social
scientists to be more attentive to the overlap of our fields, and
perhaps entice those who routinely study judicial behavior to help us
assess the broader implications of the Asylum Study.
III. THROUGH THE LENS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
As someone whose teaching and research covers immigration law
and administrative law, I believe that the Asylum Study should be
required reading for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers in both
fields. Those who study agency adjudication often limit their focus to
a single administrative context; they are overlooking some of the
most important and challenging administrative law questions if they
do not expand their field of vision to consider immigration
adjudication. On the flip side, immigration law specialists may be
surprised to discover a deja vu component to the Asylum Study. In
fact, the problem of decisional disparities in agency adjudication is a
landmine of administrative law, which has already exploded on those
who suggest that increased managerial control over agency
adjudicators is a possible route to reform.
A. A Primer on the Structure ofAgency Adjudication
The authors of the Asylum Study conclude that "the structure of
the immigration courts and the Board [of Immigration Appeals]
should be improved along with their decisional processes." 18 They
recommend increased independence for immigration judges (IJs) and
members of the Board through the creation of an Article I court for
immigration adjudication. 9 This recommendation falls at one end of
the spectrum of models of decisional independence for agency
adjudicators. To understand its implications, we must identify the full
18. Id. at 386 (citation omitted).
19.Id.
Spring 2008 Refugee Roulette 165
range of choices and consider the conflicting goals inherent in
structuring administrative adjudication.
Adjudication of cases within an executive branch agency rests on
a premise that is inconsistent with the norm of judicial independence
embodied in our Article III courts. In most administrative contexts,
the adjudicators - those individuals who decide whether to grant or
deny a benefit, or to impose a civil penalty under a particular statute -
are employees of the very agency whose caseload they adjudicate.
They are, in other words, potentially subject to the supervision and
control of one of the interested parties. 20  This is because
administrative adjudication, traditionally conceived, is not simply
about deciding individual cases; it is a means to effectuate the
statutes enacted by Congress in accordance with the priorities of the
executive branch. Agencies develop and implement policy when they
adjudicate.21 In order to promote policy consistency and ensure
accurate outcomes, agency heads may exercise supervisory oversight
over agency adjudicators, and usually have some degree of control
over their decisions as well.22
A second divergence from Article III norms also comes into play
when agencies, not courts, adjudicate. One rationale for lodging
policymaking authority in an administrative agency is the expertise
that can develop within the agency staff. While our legislators and
our Article III judges are generalists, our bureaucrats are often
specialists, with technical knowledge and experience that can
usefully be employed to further the agency's mission. We expect
20. See generally 2 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 9.9
(4th ed. 2002); Michael Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions
in FederalAdministrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 759, 759-65 (1981); James
E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary's Independence Myth, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1219-36 (2006).
21. Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an
Alternative Agency Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 965, 978-80 (1991);
Moliterno, supra note 20, at 1126. The Supreme Court has affirmed broad agency
discretion to choose rulemaking or adjudication as the vehicle for policymaking.
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194 (1947). See generally Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the
Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REv. 693 (2005); M. Elizabeth Magill,
Agency Choice of Policymaking Forum, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1383 (2004).
22. Ronald A. Cass, Allocation of Authority Within Bureaucracies: Empirical
Evidence and Normative Analysis, 66 B.U. L. REv. 1, 10-14 (1986).
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scientists to have a hand in developing food-safety standards, and
physicians and pharmacologists to determine whether a new drug
application should be approved. In some administrative contexts,
agency adjudicators are specialists as well, selected because their
background and expertise suits them to hear a particular type of
case.23 Moreover, in the federal system all agency adjudicators
specialize to some degree after they are hired, because they by and
large decide the cases of one particular agency.
There is an obvious tension between the oversight that promotes
consistency and accuracy and the decisional independence of agency
adjudicators. This tension has bedeviled administrative law from its
inception.24 The founding document of the modem administrative
state - the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) - offers one
model for resolving this tension, which centers on the particulars of
employing and supervising administrative law judges. Since the APA
was enacted in 1946, a number of additional models have sprung up,
reflecting a sliding scale of decisional independence for agency
adjudicators.25 These models reflect different choices that can be
made on two critical issues: the degree of managerial control over
adjudicators, and the degree of control over their decisions.
One option is reflected in the solution proposed in the Asylum
Study: to jettison the idea of policy control by executive branch
officials through complete separation of adjudicators from the
administrative agency whose cases they decide. The authors
recommend that immigration judges and the BIA be lodged in an
independent agency or court, and that these adjudicators serve for a
fixed term with protection from removal except for "good cause.'26
23. Asylum officers are one example. See infra note 31.
24. See Daniel J. Gifford, Federal Administrative Law Judges: The Relevance
of Past Choices to Future Directions, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1997); Antonin Scalia,
The ALJ Fiasco - A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57 (1979); Jeffrey A. Wertkin, A
Return to First Principles: Rethinking AL Compromises, 22 J. NAT'L ASS'N.
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 365, 389-91 (2002) ("The APA's conception of the AL's role ...
involves a curious mixture of autonomy and subservience.").
25. Gifford, supra note 21; Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest
for Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65 (1996).
26. Asylum Study, supra note 1, at 386-87. The Asylum Study recommends a
"statutory Article I court," but also argues for an "independent federal agency" for
immigration adjudication. Id. These are in fact two distinct variations of the
complete separation model. See infra notes 27-28.
Complete separation could be accomplished by creating a statutory
Article I court for immigration adjudication.27 It also could be
achieved by what is known in administrative law as the "split-
enforcement" model, where adjudicators remain lodged in an
executive branch agency but that agency is formally separate from
the entity that administers or enforces the law.28
The hallmark of complete separation is that adjudicators are
emancipated from the policy control that comes from vesting a
presidential appointee who also oversees enforcement with the
authority to review their decisions. According to proponents, this
leaves adjudicators "free to focus on adjudicative fairness and
efficiency, unfettered by the competing concerns of prosecutorial
imperatives. ' 29 The complete separation model is a perennial favorite
reform proposal among those who value expert adjudicators with
decisional independence; it has been proposed time and again as an
appropriate model for immigration judges and the BIA.3°
At the opposite end of the spectrum are agency decision makers
who decide cases under a strong system of managerial control of
individual adjudicators and their decisions. Asylum officers who
decide affirmative claims provide an example of how this system can
be coupled with the idea of an adjudicator with substantive expertise.
The asylum officer corps was created in 1990 to replace Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) examiners, who decided affirmative
asylum applications along with a variety of other benefits petitions.
The central premise of reform was that asylum cases should first be
adjudicated in a nonadversarial environment by a cadre of
27. See generally Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law,
43 ADMIN. L. REv. 329 (1991); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized
Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. Rev. 377.
28. See generally Gifford, supra note 21; Paul R. Verkuil & Jeffery S.
Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social Security Cases, 55
ADMIN. L. REv. 731, 773-77 (2003) (discussing the split-enforcement model and
various proposals for an Article I court within the context of Social Security
disability cases).
29. Nat'l Ass'n of Immigration Judges, An Independent Immigration Court: An
Idea Whose Time Has Come 13 (2002).
30. See id.; U.S. Comm'n on Immigration Reform, Becoming an American:
Immigration and Immigrant Policy 175-83 (1997); Maurice A. Roberts, Proposed:
A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1 (1980).
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professionals whose background, experience, and ongoing training
especially suited them to hear these sensitive claims.
3
'
Asylum officers are not exempt from the supervision experienced
by other government employees; they must meet strict timetables for
deciding cases and undergo regular performance evaluations.32 They
also are subject to a high degree of decisional control. Asylum
officers must secure their supervisor's assent in every case before a
decision issues. There also are procedures in place for advance
clearance from headquarters for especially controversial or difficult
decisions. 33 These features illustrate the tradeoff inherent in
adjudication systems that stress managerial control: decisional
independence is greatly reduced, but the system is thought to
promote policy consistency and greater uniformity of decisions.
Between the poles of complete separation and strong managerial
control are a wide variety of administrative adjudication systems that
balance these competing factors in different ways. Those not
governed by the formal adjudication provisions of the APA may
provide de facto independence that to some degree insulates agency
adjudicators from managerial control, but authorizes post-
adjudication review of their decisions by the agency.
31. See generally Gregg A. Beyer, Affirmative Asylum Adjudication in the
Untied States, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 253 (1992); Gregg A. Beyer, Establishing the
United States Asylum Officer Corps: A First Report, 4 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 455
(1992); Gregg A. Beyer, Reforming Affirmative Asylum Processing in the United
States: Challenges and Opportunities, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 43 (1994);
David A. Martin, Making Asylum Policy: The 1994 Reforms, 70 WASH. L. REv.
725, 728-31 (1995).
32. See Walter A. Ewing & Benjamin Johnson, Am. Immigration Law Found.,
Asylum Essentials: The U.S. Asylum Program Needs More Resources, Not
Restrictions (2005), available at http://www.ailf.org/ipc/
policy-reports_2005_asylumessentials.asp (stating that case completion guidelines
require asylum officers to conduct eighteen asylum interviews each two-week pay
period); Memorandum from Joseph E. Langlois, Chief, Asylum Div., U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Servs., to All Asylum Office Personnel (Oct. 10,
2006) (on file with author) (detailing asylum office's success in meeting case
processing goals).
33. Asylum Study, supra note 1, at 308. AILA's quality assurance referral
sheet details those categories of cases that must be referred to headquarters for
review prior to issuance of a decision. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs.,
Quality Assurance Referral Sheet (Nov. 6, 2001) (on file with author).
Immigration judges and members of the BIA operate in such an
environment. They are employed by the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR), lodged within the Department of
Justice, rather than by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
whose enforcement cases they adjudicate.34 This structure looks
something like the split-enforcement model, except that the Attorney
General and the Secretary of DHS (along with the Chairman or a
majority of the BIA) can refer Board decisions to the Attorney
General for review. 35 IJ decisions, in contrast, are not subject to any
oversight within the agency, either before or after they are issued.
The only review of an IJ's work product happens via party-initiated
appeals to the BIA. EOIR issues case completion guidelines for
immigration judges and Board members, and is in the process of
establishing a formal system of performance evaluation as well.36
The features of de facto independence vary from agency to
agency and - unless incorporated in an agency's governing statute -
can be revised by executive branch officials. In contrast,
administrative law judges (ALJs) 37 employed in a number of federal
34. When Congress created DHS, responsibility for immigration enforcement
was moved from the former INS to DHS. The INS was, like EOIR, lodged within
the Department of Justice, giving the Attorney General authority over both the
enforcers and the adjudicators of immigration law. See Margaret H. Taylor, Behind
the Scenes of St. Cyr and Zadvydas: Making Policy in the Midst of Litigation, 16
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 271, 288-95 (2002). When Congress abolished the INS and
created DHS, but left EOIR within the Department of Justice, it created an unusual
agency structure: one presidential appointee (the Attorney General) exercises
policy control over EOIR adjudicators, but a second (the Secretary of DHS)
presides over a separate agency with authority over immigration enforcement. See
David A. Martin, Immigration Policy and the Homeland Security Act
Reorganization: An Early Agenda for Practical Improvements, Insight (Migration
Policy Inst., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2003, at 1, 18-19.
35. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (2007). The regulation does not specify any
substantive criteria for referral. Rather, it delineates those who have authority to
invoke this mechanism of policy control. Referrals of BIA decisions to the
Attorney General are rare, but this option does give the Department of Justice final
say in adjudicated matters of immigration policy. For an explanation of how
referral operated before the creation of DHS, see Taylor, supra note 34.
36. Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,673 (Sept.
20, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1240).
37. The phrase "administrative law judge" is a term of art; it is not (as many
law students mistakenly assume) a generic phrase that can be used to describe any
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agencies experience a particular form of independence established by
the APA. ALJ independence includes a number of features that
insulate ALJs from the managerial control of their employing
agencies. An agency that employs ALJs cannot seek out candidates
with relevant expertise and hire them directly; instead, ALJ
candidates must be screened through procedures established by the
Office of Personnel Management and selected according to rigid
statutory criteria.38 Once hired, ALJs cannot be supervised by anyone
who performs investigative or prosecuting functions within the
agency.39 They also are exempt by statute from the annual
performance appraisals conducted for virtually all other federal
agency adjudicator. Instead, administrative law judges decide claims under the
APA's provisions for formal adjudication. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3) (2000) ("There
shall preside at the taking of evidence [in a formal adjudication] ... one or more
administrative law judges as appointed under section 3105 of this title."). The vast
majority of agency adjudications are not formal adjudications under the APA;
procedures for these so-called informal adjudications are established by the
agency's governing statute and regulations. The term "informal" is not meant to
describe the actual formality of a hearing. Removal proceedings conducted by an
immigration judge are a good example of administrative adjudications that look
quite formal but are not governed by the APA. See generally Lubbers, supra note
25.
38. See generally Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A
Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REv. 109, 112-20 (1981). An oft-
criticized feature of the statutory selection criteria for ALJs is the veteran's
preference, which adds points to the eligibility score of veterans and restricts an
agency's ability to pass over a qualified veteran to choose an applicant without
veteran status. 5 U.S.C.§§2108, 3309 (2000). Women are significantly
underrepresented in the ALJ corps by operation of the veteran's preference. See
Elaine Golin, Note, Solving the Problem of Gender and Racial Bias in
Administrative Adjudication, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1532, 1549-50 (1995). The
statutory selection criteria for ALJs also reflect an overemphasis on litigation
experience, and an underemphasis on judicial temperament and substantive
expertise. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46
ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 292-95 (1994). The Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS) has criticized the criteria and procedures used to select ALJs and
recommended various changes. See Paul R. Verkuil et al., Report for
Recommendation 92-7: The Federal Administrative Judiciary, in 2 Administrative
Conference of the United States, Recommendations and Reports 777, 954-67
(1992).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2000).
employees. 40 Finally, ALJs can be removed only for "good cause"
after a hearing before the Merit Systems Protection Board.4' While
ALJs are personally insulated from agency control by these
provisions, their decisions are subject to reconsideration within the
agency.42 Thus, AU independence all but extinguishes an agency's
authority over hiring, firing, and supervision of its ALJs, but gives an
agency control - according to whatever administrative appeal or
quality assurance procedures the agency might establish - over AU
decisions.
A system of administrative adjudication can incorporate different
models of decisional independence at different levels. This is true, as
I have noted, for the asylum process. In addition, multi-tiered
systems use different procedures for moving cases up to the next
adjudication level, and can adopt different decisional standards - such
as de novo consideration or a particular standard of review - at each
level.
B. Comparing Asylum and Disability Adjudication
Armed with this understanding of the structure of agency
adjudication, we now turn to consider the deja vu aspect of the
Asylum Study. For administrative law scholars, the Asylum Study's
findings immediately call to mind the long history of attempts to
redress decisional disparities in disability determinations made by the
Social Security Administration (SSA).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D) (2000). See generally Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The
Federal Administrative Judiciary: Establishing an Appropriate System of
Performance Evaluation for ALJs, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 589 (1993); L. Hope
O'Keeffe, Note, Administrative Law Judges, Performance Evaluation, and
Production Standards: Judicial Independence Versus Employee Accountability, 54
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 591 (1986).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2000).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000). The APA specifies that "on appeal from or
review of the initial decision [of an ALJ], the agency has all the powers which it
would have in making the initial decision." Id. Reviewing courts have limited an
agency's ability to overturn ALI decisions that are based on witness credibility or
demeanor. See Loomis Courier Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1979);
Penasquitos Vill., Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Social security disability adjudication has spawned the classic
book on agency adjudication - Jerry Mashaw's Bureaucratic Justice,43
written in 1983 - along with a dizzying array of scholarly studies 44
and reports issued by government agencies 45  and outside
43. Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security
Disability Claims (1983) [hereinafter Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice]. Professor
Mashaw was also the project director for an earlier study sponsored by the National
Center for Administrative Justice, then an entity of the American Bar Association.
Jerry Mashaw et al., Social Security Hearings and Appeals (1978) [hereinafter
Mashaw et al., Social Security Hearings and Appeals]. A third oft-cited book is a
study by a political scientist: Donna Price Cofer, Judges, Bureaucrats, and the
Question of Independence: A Study of the Social Security Administration Hearing
Process (1985).
44. See, e.g., Frank S. Bloch et al., Developing a Full and Fair Evidentiary
Record in a Nonadversary Setting: Two Proposals for Improving Social Security
Disability Adjudications, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2003); Charles H. Koch, Jr. &
David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and
Utility of the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 199, 229 (1990); Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations:
Recommendations for Reform, 1990 BYU L. REv. 461; Verkuil & Lubbers, supra
note 28; Jeffrey Scott Wolfe, Are You Willing to Make the Commitment in Writing?
The APA, ALds, and SSA, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 203 (2002).
45. Congress's "watchdog agency," the U.S. General Accounting Office (now
known as the U.S. Government Accountability Office), has issued numerous
reports on disability adjudication. The general tenor of these reports is captured in
the following titles: Jane L. Ross, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, SSA Actions to
Reduce Backlogs and Achieve More Consistent Decisions Deserve High Priority
(1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97118t.pdf [hereinafter
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, SSA Actions to Reduce Backlogs]; U.S. Gen.
Accounting Office, Disappointing Results from SSA's Efforts to Improve the
Disability Claims Process Warrant Immediate Attention (2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02322.pdf; U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, More
Effort Needed to Assess Consistency of Disability Decisions (2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04656.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Gen. Accounting
Office, Consistency of Disability Decisions]. For a succinct summary of the claims
adjudication process and the most recent proposed reforms, see Scott Szymendera,
Cong. Research Serv., Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI): Proposed Changes to the Disability
Determination and Appeals Process (Apr. 24, 2006), available at
http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33179_20060424.pdf. The independent, bipartisan
Social Security Advisory Board has also issued reports on SSA adjudication. See
Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., Disability Decision Making: Data and Materials (May
2006), available at http://www.ssab.gov/documents/chartbook.pdf [hereinafter Soc.
Sec. Advisory Bd., Disability Decision making]; Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd.,
Improving the Social Security Administration's Hearing Process (Sept. 2006),
consultants.46 The process of resolving disability claims is "the
largest system of administrative adjudication in the Western world."47
SSA receives some five million disability applications each year,48
and its ALJs resolve almost 500,000 contested cases.49 A just and
efficient resolution of these claims is vitally important to deserving
beneficiaries, for whom "disability benefits often provide the barest
cushion against destitution, 50  and to the integrity of America's
promise to provide a means of support for those who are unable to
work because of serious disabling conditions. 51  Building an
adjudication system to deliver on this promise has been
extraordinarily difficult, however. Among the most visible and
intractable problems - indeed, a central theme of multiple studies and
several attempted reforms of disability adjudication - is a concern
available at http://www.ssab.gov/ documents/HearingProcess.pdf [hereinafter Soc.
Sec. Advisory Bd., Hearing Process Report].
46. The Lewin Group et al., Evaluation of SSA's Disability Quality Assurance
(QA) Processes and Development of QA Options that Will Support the Long-Term
Management of the Disability Program (2001), available at
http://www.disabilitydoc.com/ssa-disability-quality-assuran.
47. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice, supra note 43, at 18.
48. Soc. Sec. Admin., SSA Publ'n No. 13-11700, Annual Statistical
Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin tbls.2.F5 & 2.F6 (2007), available at
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/ 2006/2f4-2f6.pdf
(displaying combined totals of Disability Insurance and Social Security Insurance
claims received in fiscal year 2005).
49. Szymendera, supra note 45, at 1 (noting that in fiscal year 2004, ALJs
issued rulings in 495,029 appeals of initial disability denials).
50. Koch & Koplow, supra note 44, at 229.
51. The disability adjudications discussed in this essay encompass two
programs administered by the Social Security Administration. The first, Social
Security Disability Insurance, provides cash benefits and medical coverage to
persons under sixty-five who meet the statutory definition of disability and have
worked a requisite number of qualifying quarters. The second, Supplemental
Security Income, is a means-tested welfare program for persons of limited income
who are disabled. Under both programs, "disability" is defined as an "inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months." 42 U.S.C.§§423(d)(1)(A), 1382(c)(a)(3)(A) (2000). See generally
Szymendera, supra note 45, at 1-3; Koch & Koplow, supra note 44, at 204-25.
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that "the outcome of cases depends more on who decides the case"
than on the underlying facts or applicable legal standards. 52
Disability adjudication therefore provides a portal to the
administrative law context of the Asylum Study because the SSA
system is plagued with decisional disparities quite similar to those
documented in the Asylum Study. 3 Asylum and disability cases also
share two features that contribute to the problem of inconsistent
decisions: a multi-tiered adjudication system, which provides
multiple opportunities to present a claim under different procedures,
and an underlying claim that is both legally complex and fact-
specific.
While the particulars vary in several respects, applicants for
asylum and SSA disability claimants move through adjudication
systems with some structural features in common. Both systems start
with an application filed in a nonadversarial setting, which is
adjudicated by an officer who decides applications within a system of
managerial control. Disability applications are decided in the first
instance by examiners in state Disability Determination Service
agencies, who review the paper record. 4 Asylum applicants are
interviewed in person by an asylum officer.55 In both systems,
disappointed claimants get another "bite at the apple" when their
claim is heard de novo at the next level. In the asylum context, this
52. Mashaw et al., Social Security Hearings and Appeals, supra note 43, at xxi.
53. Some courts have noted similarities between the asylum and disability
adjudication systems. See Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 453-54 (7th Cir. 2006)
(suggesting that the SSA model of using vocational experts in disability cases
should be adapted to the asylum context, to provide immigration judges with
"concrete, case-specific" evidence on country conditions); Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d
725, 733 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Both administrative settings have the common feature of
determining the applicant's eligibility for certain benefits... . Both social security
and deportation hearings are likely to be unfamiliar settings for the applicant.");
Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 972 (9th Cir. 1996) (Noonan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that an immigration judge has a duty to develop the record similar to that of an ALJ
in social security disability cases).
54. Levy, supra note 44, at 467-7 1; see also Bloch et al., supra note 44, at 22-
26. Disappointed claimants must file a petition for reconsideration with the state
agency before they move to the ALJ hearing stage. Id. New regulations will change
this, and instead impose review by a federal reviewing official. See Administrative
Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 16,424,
16,432-34 (Mar. 31, 2006).
55. Asylum Study, supra note 1, at 306.
happens automatically because applicants who do not convince the
asylum officer are referred to removal proceedings before an
immigration judge.56 Disability applicants who lose at the state level
may choose to present their case anew to an administrative law judge
employed by the Social Security Administration. 57
Both systems currently provide for administrative appeals from
the ALJ or IJ decision, but here procedures in the two agencies
diverge significantly. In the asylum context, the party that loses
before an IJ - either a disappointed applicant or the government - can
appeal to the BIA. The Board uses a "clearly erroneous" standard to
review IJs' findings of facts, and a de novo standard for questions of
law, discretion, and judgment.58 Asylum applicants who lose before
the BIA can petition for review in the circuit courts of appeals. 59
In the social security context, a disappointed claimant (but not the
government) can request a review of an ALJ decision before the
administrative appeals unit, currently known as the Appeals Council.
There is no right to administrative appeal, however, and the Appeals
Council may decline review.60 The Appeals Council also decides a
number of cases on its own motion, as part of quality assurance
review. Under this procedure (which has varied over time, as
discussed below), ALJ decisions can be selected for review before
they take effect, and will be modified or reversed if the Appeals
Council finds error.61
The administrative appeals body has recently become a flashpoint
in the SSA and asylum adjudication systems. In both contexts, a
crushing caseload has prompted procedural reforms and a
56. Id.at 306-07.
57. This constitutes their first chance to appear in person at a hearing;
claimants may be represented but no government attorney opposes the application.
See Bloch et al., supra note 44, at 26; Levy, supra note 44, at 471-72.
58. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3) (2007).
59. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, §
242(a)(l)-(b)(2), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (exempting asylum from the bar on judicial
review of discretionary decisions). The INA is codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A.
§§1-1178 (West 2007).
60. Koch & Koplow, supra note 44, at 243; Soc. Sec. Admin., Social
Security's Appeals Council Review Process,
http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/appeals-process.html; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a)
(2007) (specifying four grounds on which the Council will grant review).
61. Koch & Koplow, supra note 44, at 245-49.
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concomitant shift in the role of the appeals unit.6 2 As described in the
Asylum Study, the BIA now decides administrative appeals under
streamlined procedures that promote single-member decisions. 63 This
has greatly reduced its role of promoting uniformity and policy
consistency through precedent decisions. The Social Security
Administration has recently promulgated regulations to create a new
body, the Decision Review Board, to perform the quality assurance
function of Appeals Council own-motion review. 64 Under the new
regulation, the Appeals Council is being phased out; once it is
eliminated disappointed claimants will no longer be able to seek
administrative review of an ALJ decision.65 Their only recourse after
an ALJ denial will be a petition for judicial review in federal district
court.
66
In addition to moving through multi-tiered adjudication systems
with some structural similarities, disability and asylum cases are
specialized, highly complex, and require adjudicators to make a
binary yes-or-no decision on a claim that could fall anywhere along a
continuum.67 In both contexts, decision makers must navigate a
62. Professors Koch and Koplow describe the Appeals Council circa 1990 in
language that also seems apt for the BIA today: "Members of the Appeals Council
are snowed under with files ... " Koch & Koplow, supra note 44, at 258 n.312,
"[and] now function almost exclusively as case handlers, not as policymakers,
[in an] operation that resembles a factory assembly line," id. at 266-67.
63. Asylum Study, supra note 1, at 350-53, 356-57, 385.
64. Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims,
71 Fed. Reg. 16,424, 16,437 (Mar. 31, 2006).
65. Id. at 16,437-38, 16,441.
66. Id. at 16,438.
67. Stephen Legomsky identifies this last factor as the "spectrum of choice" of
a decision. He explains that "some subjects provide more than the usual leeway to
adjudicators" and posits that for asylum adjudication the spectrum of choice is
"exceptionally broad." Legomsky, supra note 7, at 443. David Martin has also
developed this point in a discussion of why the factual issues in asylum cases are so
difficult to resolve, which is highly relevant to the Asylum Study. David A. Martin,
Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA.
L. REv. 1247, 1270-87 (1990). Professor Martin observes that "asylum seekers
present a spectrum of situations, with only subtle shadings distinguishing the risk
levels they face. Adjudication must draw a line at some point on that spectrum." Id.
at 1278 (footnote omitted). Richard Pierce notes the same phenomenon in disability
determinations. He explains that cases disputed up to the ALJ level often involve
claims of pain or mental illness, which require ALJs to make subjectiye "yes-or-no
"dense thicket" of statutes, regulations, and case law, but at the same
time the ultimate decision turns on "fine-grained attention to the
intimate facts on the record '68  and an assessment of whether the
applicant is telling the truth. Because credibility looms so large in
asylum claims,69 and in many contested disability cases,7" the
accuracy of any given decision may be unknowable. 71 As Stephen
Legomsky notes in his response to the Asylum Study, these factors
all promote a high degree of variance among agency adjudicators.72
C. The Unhappy History of Attempted Reform in the
Disability Adjudication Context
The earliest studies of the adjudication system for disability
claims found "that a claimant's success ... is substantially affected by
the identity of the presiding ALJ.'73 Since then, the oft-repeated
wisdom is that decisional disparities in disability adjudication are
"patent 7 4 - or even "manifest and alarming. 7 5 Some studies assess
"horizontal inconsistency," 76 documenting differences in allowance
rates among different hearing offices or different decision makers at
decisions on disability when the applicant's ability to work and the severity of the
underlying illness could fall anywhere along a vast spectrum." Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking:
Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 511 (1990); see also
Levy, supra note 44, at 467 (disability determinations are "highly technical and
complex" and require evaluation of evidence that is "inherently subjective")
(footnotes omitted).
68. Koch & Koplow, supra note 44, at 228.
69. Legomsky, supra note 7, at 443; Martin, supra note 67, at 1281-82.
70. Koch & Koplow, supra note 44 at 229; Levy, supra note 44, at 467; Pierce,
supra note 67, at 502 & n.85.
71. Koch & Koplow, supra note 44, at 270 ("Accuracy in a disability case is
extremely difficult to define, let alone measure or achieve. No one we spoke with
was able to articulate a workable definition of "accuracy."'); Legomsky, supra note
7, at 425.
72. Legomsky, supra note 7, at Part 439-44.
73. Mashaw et al., Social Security Hearings and Appeals, supra note 43, at 21.
74. Id. at xxi.
75. Koch & Koplow, supra note 44, at 283.
76. The term is borrowed from Professors Koch and Koplow, who define
"horizontal consistency" as "the similarity of decisions in different venues" at the
same adjudication level. Id.
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the same adjudication level.77 (This is similar to the analysis in the
Asylum Study, which analyzes horizontal consistency at four levels
of asylum adjudication.) But the key concern in the social security
context has been "vertical inconsistency"'78 between state disability
examiners and federal ALJs.7 9
State disability examiners allow roughly forty percent of initial
claims.80 Allowance rates for federal ALJs, whose caseload consists
of claimants who were denied benefits at the state level, have
fluctuated between fifty-eight percent and seventy-two percent since
1985.81 Although there are a number of factors that might feed into
this apparent generosity, 82 policymakers have long been concerned
with the seeming anomaly of a relatively high allowance rate in a
pool of cases that initially were rejected.
Reflecting this concern, efforts to reform disability adjudication
have sometimes been coupled with a desire to reduce the overall
77. See Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., Disability Decision Making, supra note 45, at
29 chart 13 (comparing average allowance rate in each state, at the state Disability
Determination Services level and at the federal ALJ level); Szymendera, supra note
45, at 13 tbl.4 (showing high, low, and average grant rates for state Disability
Determination Services offices).
78. Koch & Koplow, supra note 44, at 283 (""Vertical consistency' is achieved
when decisionmakers evaluate a case according to the same procedures and legal
standards at each tier of the appellate review ladder. It requires harmony among all
the adjudicatory levels regarding standards for case handling, definitions of
eligibility, and interpretations of policy.").
79. See Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., Disability Decision Making, supra note 45, at
29 chart 13 (comparing initial decision and ALJ allowance rate in each state); U.S.
Gen. Accounting Office, Consistency of Disability Decisions, supra note 45, at 1,
7, 10-12 (giving figures and assessing causes of vertical inconsistency); U.S. Gen.
Accounting Office, SSA Actions to Reduce Backlogs, supra note 45; see also
Daniel J. Gifford, Need Like Cases Be Decided Alike? Mashaw's Bureaucratic
Justice, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 985, 987 (asserting that SSA efforts to achieve
more consistent determinations are undermined by the "excessive independence of
ALJs").
80. Szymendera, supra note 45, at 7.
81. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Consistency of Disability Decisions, supra
note 45, at 1.
82. ALJs may grant applications at a higher level than state offices because
they are the only adjudicators who meet the applicant face-to-face, have more
opportunity to develop a record, and historically were governed by different rules
and guidelines than the state offices. See Bloch et al., supra note 44, at 26, 33-34;
Levy, supra note 44, at 498.
allowance rates of ALJs. s3 And that helps to explain why reform
efforts created such controversy, resulting in "an agency at war with
itself."8 4 I will relate the story of two skirmishes in this war:
programs that targeted individual ALJs or their decisions for special
review, and a proposal to subject all ALJs to greater oversight
through performance evaluations.
Social security ALJs with high grant rates or low productivity
have, at various times, had their decisions subject to special scrutiny
or (for a handful of low-producing judges) been subject to "for cause"
removal actions. This targeting began in the 1970s, when the director
of SSA's hearing office, Robert Trachtenberg, established a Quality
Assurance Review program with several components. Director
Trachtenberg issued productivity memos to ALJs stating quotas for
decisions per month; he then revised personnel policies to create
incentives to reach the productivity goals.85 Trachtenberg also
instituted a program of post-adjudicatory review of AU decisions.
The most controversial part of this program would have singled out
the decisions of low-producing ALJs for Regional Chief Review. 86
Several ALJs sued, contending the Trachtenberg policies unlawfully
intruded on various aspects of ALJ independence. The lawsuit was
settled when SSA agreed to modify these programs significantly to
meet AU objections. 87
83. Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1137
("Evidence ... strongly suggested that [the Office of Hearing Administration] had
an ulterior goal to reduce ALJ allowance rates."); Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice,
supra note 43, at 174-78. But see Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 681 (2d. Cir.
1989) ("The agency maintained then, and maintains now, that reducing [allowance]
rates was not the intent of the policy.").
84. Koch & Koplow, supra note 44, at 231.
85. Levy, supra note 44, at 478; see also Cofer, supra note 43, at 93-96.
86. Cofer, supra note 43, at 87.
87. Id. at 111-12 (describing the June 7, 1979 settlement in Bono v. Social
Security Administration). The Trachtenberg initiatives are also described in two
reported cases arising from a decade-long lawsuit brought by an ALJ challenging
various aspects of the program. See Bowen, 869 F.2d at 675 (holding that
individual ALJ did not have standing to challenge SSA's nonacquiescence policy
and that other challenged practices did not unlawfully intrude onto ALJ
independence); Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
individual ALJ had standing to challenge allegedly unlawful intrusions onto ALJ
independence).
Spring 2008 Refugee Roulette
180 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 28-1
Congress then entered the fray. A 1980 amendment to the Social
Security Act, known as the "Bellmon Amendment," directed the SSA
Appeals Council to create a significant program of own-motion
review of ALJ decisions. 88 The legislative history indicated that
Congress was concerned with the high allowance rate of ALJs after
state disability denials, and with the considerable disparity in the
allowance rates among individual ALJs.89 The resulting Bellmon
Review Program had several phases; most controversial was the
initial decision to target those ALJs with high allowance rates for
more extensive review. ALJs who allowed more than seventy percent
of claims, for example, would have all of their decisions screened for
review under the Appeals Council own-motion procedures. 90
A number of lawsuits were filed to challenge the Bellmon
Review Program, including one by the Association of Administrative
Law Judges, which contended that targeting the decisions of ALJs
with high allowance rates created considerable pressure for them to
deny benefits in violation of ALJ independence guarantees. 91 While
that case was pending, the Bellmon Review Program was modified
considerably, so that the individual targeting components of own-
motion review were removed before the district court ruled in 1984.92
88. Own-motion review by the Appeals Council had been dormant for several
years prior to the Bellmon Amendment. Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler,
594 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 n.6 (1984). The Association of Administrative Law
Judges decision contains a detailed description of the various phases of the
Bellmon Review Program created under this statute. Id. at 1135 & nn.7-8, 1136;
see also Cofer, supra note 43, at 117-22; U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Social
Security: Results of Required Reviews of Administrative Law Judge Decisions
(1989), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d25t7/139091.pdf; Levy, supra note 44,
at 497-500.
89. Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges, 594 F. Supp. at 1134.
90. Id. at 1134-36; U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 88, at 8. Only
ALJ grants, not denials, were originally included in Appeals Council own-motion
review. This disparity was justified, according to SSA, by studies that suggested
that a high rate of allowance indicated a high rate of ALJ error, and also by the fact
that the Appeals Council already reviewed a significant number of ALJ denials via
claimant petitions for review. Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges, 594 F. Supp. at 1134.
91. Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges, 594 F. Supp. at 1136.
92. In 1982, SSA discontinued its use of ALJ allowance rates as the selection
criteria, and instead targeted individual ALJs according to their "own-motion rates"
- the frequency with which the Appeals Council took corrective actions on their
decisions. Id. at 1134-35. In 1984, the SSA eliminated the individual ALJ portion
Finding that these changes were "significantly for the better," the
court declined to enjoin operation of the program. 93 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the SSA's "unremitting focus on allowance rates
in the individual AL portion of the Bellmon Review Program
created an untenable atmosphere of tension and unfairness which
violated the spirit of the APA, if no specific provision thereof."9 4
Both the Trachtenberg initiatives and the Bellmon Review
Program targeted the decisions of ALJs with high grant rates or low
productivity for special review. While SSA ALJs perceived that they
could be subject to adverse personnel actions if their productivity or
the outcome of their decisions did not eventually fall in line with
agency expectations, no such actions were taken under the Bellmon
program. 95 In the mid-1980s, however, the SSA brought "for cause"
removal actions before the Merit Systems Protections Board (MSPB)
against three low-producing ALJs.96 The Board held that low
productivity could in principle form the basis for removing an AU. It
also concluded, however, that the SSA's evidence that an AL's case
disposition rate was one-half the national average was not sufficient
to establish "good cause" "in the absence of evidence demonstrating
of Bellmon Review, and increased the number of cases reviewed from a random
national sample. Id. at 1135-36.
93. Id. at 1141, 1143.
94. Id. at 1143; see also Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 680 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding that, while coercion of ALJs to lower allowance rates would infringe
decisional independence, "the efforts complained of in this case for promoting
quality and efficiency do not"). In a separate lawsuit challenging the procedures
used to promulgate the Bellmon Review program, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
Bellmon Review program was a substantive rule that was improperly established
without notice-and-comment procedures, and ordered that ALJ decisions that had
been set aside by Appeals Council own-motion review should be reinstated. W.C.
v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502, 1505-06 (9th Cir. 1987).
95. Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges, 594 F. Supp. at 1135, 1142.
96. Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Balaban, 20 M.S.P.R. 675 (1984); Soc. Sec. Admin. v.
Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321 (1984); Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Brennan, 19 M.S.P.R. 335
(1984), opinion clarified, 20 M.S.P.R. 35 (1984). These cases, and the broader
issue of establishing production standards for ALJs, are discussed in Lubbers,
supra note 40, at 599-600; Pierce, supra note 67, at 504-07; James P. Timony,
Performance Evaluation of Federal Administrative Law Judges, 7 ADM1N. L.J. AM.
U. 629, 642-44 (1993); and O'Keeffe, supra note 40, at 614-24.
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the validity of using its statistics to measure comparative
productivity. '" 97
As Jeffrey Lubbers, former Research Director of the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), describes it,
the Social Security Administration's attempts throughout the 1970s
and 1980s to assert managerial control over its ALJs resulted in a set
of "mixed signals" about the legal contours of ALJ independence and
the limits of agency management prerogatives. 98 Courts affirmed the
agency's authority to set "reasonable production goals, as opposed to
fixed quotas." 99 Meanwhile, the MSPB recognized that an ALJ's
failure to meet production goals could be grounds for removal, but
set a "virtually insurmountable burden of proof' in such cases. 00
Finally, quality assurance through own-motion review by the
Appeals Council was upheld, but only after the SSA abandoned a
system that targeted ALJs with high allowance rates for this
procedure. Perhaps the most significant legacy of this era, however,
is not found in the annals of reported cases. The APA's uneasy
compromise establishing ALJ independence was severely tested
during this period, resulting in a "legacy of tension" between social
security ALJs and their employing agency.°10
It was against this backdrop that ACUS, at the request of the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM), undertook a study of the
federal administrative judiciary in the early 1990s. 10 2 ACUS was an
advisory agency whose mission was to study and improve the
functioning of federal bureaucracy. It had funded a number of
significant research studies on social security disability
adjudication. 10 3 The authors of this broader study on the
administrative judiciary - all preeminent scholars of administrative
law - were well-attuned to the details of SSA's efforts to assert
greater managerial control over its ALJs. Thus, they waded carefully
97. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. at 331.
98. Lubbers, supra note 40, at 595-96.
99. Bowen, 869 F.2d at 680.
100. Lubbers, supra note 40, at 599-600.
101. Levy, supra note 44, at 502.
102. See Verkuil et al., supra note 38.
103. Verkuil & Lubbers, supra note 28, at 737 n.16 (listing ACUS
recommendations emerging from numerous ACUS-funded studies of disability
adjudication).
into the debate, seeking to find some middle ground to balance
adequate protection of ALJ decisional independence against an
employing agency's need to ensure a reasonable degree of uniformity,
productivity, and adherence to law and agency policy in
administrative adjudication.
The study authors concluded that the "good cause" standard for
removal of ALJs was an important component of decisional
independence, and that removal actions should be considered a "last
resort" for extreme instances of misconduct, insubordination, or low
productivity. 10 4 At the same time, they stressed that agencies needed
"other approaches for assessing and dealing with apparent or alleged
instances of misbehavior, bias, or unacceptably low productivity on
the part of their ALJs."' °5 Among the recommendations to emerge
from the ACUS study was that Congress should authorize a system
whereby the Chief ALJ in an agency that employed more than one
ALJ would, in consultation with other agency ALJs and with
oversight from OPM, "conduct regular ALJ performance reviews,
based on relevant factors, including case processing guidelines,
judicial comportment and demeanor, and the existence, if any, of a
clear disregard of or pattern of nonadherence to properly articulated
and disseminated rules, procedures, precedent, and other agency
policy."'10 6
The political fallout was swift and fierce. The ACUS proposal
met "indignant opposition" from a well-organized ALJ lobby,10 7
which decried the notion that agency managers - who "look too much
at computer printouts, read too little history, and fail to provide for
the individual nature of each case" 10 8  - should exercise greater
oversight over their productivity and their adherence to precedent and
agency policy. The fact that the ACUS proposal would lodge this
function in the Chief ALJ (which the study authors described as a
104. Lubbers, supra note 40, at 600.
105. Id.
106. Recommendations and Statements of the Administrative Conference
Regarding Administrative Practice and Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,759, 61,764
(Dec. 29, 1992) (codified at 1 C.F.R. pts. 305, 310).
107. Lloyd Musolf, Performance Evaluation of Federal Administrative Law
Judges: Challenge for Public Administration?, 28 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 390, 394
(1998).
108. Timony, supra note 96, at 653.
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form of peer review) 10 9 and would impose various safeguards on the
exercise of this authority did little to blunt the opposition. Ultimately,
the issue became linked to larger political agendas, including a
promise by Republicans who had just gained control of the House of
Representatives to shrink the federal government." 0 ACUS was a
"low-profile" agency without a natural constituency, virtually
unknown outside circles of administrative law. 11 Despite the fact
that its budget was "minuscule" and its mission was to foster
government reform,112 it became a tempting target for a Congress
looking to "show the taxpayers that once an agency is created, it does
not have eternal life." '113 And so in 1995 the Administrative
Conference of the United States lost its congressional funding. A
thorough study of the legislative history of its demise concludes that
vocal opposition from some ALJs who were outraged at the ACUS
proposal to subject them to greater oversight played a significant
role.' 
1 4
IV. POLICY CHOICES IN CONTEXT
Our case study of attempted reform of disability adjudication
shows that efforts to promote uniformity and policy consistency
through increased managerial control over agency adjudicators and
their decisions have generated significant controversy with limited
results. One might therefore conclude that it is a good idea to steer
well clear of this approach. This is the route taken by the authors of
the Asylum Study. After proposing enhanced resources, better
training, and more rigorous hiring standards for immigration judges
and the BIA (all important and necessary reforms), the study authors
109. Lubbers, supra note 40, at 604.
110. Toni M. Fine, A Legislative Analysis of the Demise of the Administrative
Conference of the United States, 30 ARiz. ST. L.J. 19, 91-92 (1998).
II .Id. at 93.
112. Id. at66.
113. Id. at78.
114. Id. at 59-61, 95-97. Professor Fine concludes that the Republican Party's
desire to eliminate an agency was the "greatest contributing factor" to the
defunding of ACUS demise, but that the process "was set in motion by a small but
outspoken group of disaffected administrative law judges" unhappy with ACUS's
recommendations. Id. at 113-14. Congress has recently shown interest in reviving
ACUS. See Regulatory Improvement Act of 2007, H.R. 3564, 110th Cong. (2007)
(authorizing appropriations for ACUS through fiscal year 2011).
call for complete separation of EOIR adjudicators from the
Department of Justice.
In the meantime, the DOJ and EOIR, through a number of
management directives, seem to be moving in the opposite direction.
Responding to harsh criticism of the BIA and immigration judges,
former Attorney General Gonzales announced in January of 2006
that DOJ would conduct an internal review of EOIR. In August of
that year, he released a memorandum outlining initiatives that DOJ
and EOIR would undertake to improve the operation of immigration
courts and the BIA. First on the list was establishing a system of
"performance evaluations to enable EOIR leadership to review
periodically the work and performance of each immigration judge
and member of the Board of Immigration Appeals."' 15 In September
of 2007, DOJ published a final rule to make explicit the legal
authority to establish a system of performance appraisals for
immigration judges and Board members. 116 Implementation is
"targeted for the July 2007-June 2008 rating period."' 1 7 This program
has been developed internally, without input from stakeholders
outside EOIR and without public disclosure of the procedures or
criteria for evaluating IJs and Board Members.
With this recent action, we see two policy options on the table.
As scholars call for greater independence for EOIR adjudicators, the
executive branch moves toward exercising greater managerial
control. In my mind, neither option can be fully embraced until we
know important details: how an independent agency for immigration
adjudication would be structured, for example, or what criteria will
be used and what possible sanctions lurk in IJ performance review.
We can, however, identify some potential problems that might be
overlooked by those who consider EOIR reform in isolation, apart
115. Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R.
Gonzales Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration
Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html.
116. Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,673,
53,675 (Sept. 20, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1240).
117. Memorandum from Kevin D. Rooney, Dir., Executive Office for
Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to All Executive Office for Immigration
Review Employees (undated) (on file with author) [hereinafter Rooney Memo].
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from its administrative law context, and we can consider how these
options ought to be implemented if pursued."1 I
Turning first to EOIR's performance evaluation proposal, the
agency is moving toward the landmine that exploded on SSA and
ACUS. That is not to say that a similar blowback is inevitable. The
legal context is different for ALJs and EOIR adjudicators, because
AU protection from managerial control is enshrined in the APA. The
political context is different as well. Efforts to reign in agency
adjudicators might be greeted with opposition, support, or
indifference, depending on the extent of publicity, the degree of
sympathy for beneficiaries of the program, the particulars of how
control is exercised, and the political clout of the judges' union.
Recent assaults on the decisional independence of immigration
adjudicators, however, have created a climate of mistrust within
EOIR and among its stakeholders that may fuel opposition to EOIR's
performance evaluation system.
The agency's new regulation promises to "provide for
performance appraisals for immigration judges and Board members
while fully respecting their roles as adjudicators.""119 119 But this
promise to protect decisional independence is accompanied by
statements that EOIR adjudicators "do not serve in a purely judicial
capacity" and "are subject to the Attorney General's direction and
control" 120  - assertions echoed in other regulations that have
undermined decisional independence within EOIR over the past few
118. Professor Legomsky suggests, for example, that immigration judges could
be made into ALJs. Legomsky, supra note 7, at 471. This proposal cuts against the
quite sensible idea that immigration judges should be selected with an eye toward
the challenges of their specific docket, and that "it would be desirable for the
judges to have some degree of knowledge or experience with immigration law."
Asylum Study, supra note 1, at 380. Even if one embraces the structural features of
ALJ independence as appropriate in this context, the rigid statutory criteria and the
procedures for selecting ALJs are fraught with problems that I would not impose
on the immigration courts. See supra note 38.
119. Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,676-77.
120. Id. at 53,673. The preamble to the new regulation authorizing the Director
of EOIR to create a system of performance evaluation also quotes the Second
Circuit decision upholding SSA efforts to improve the quality and timeliness of
ALJ disability decisions. Id. at 53,674 (quoting Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 681
(2d Cir. 1989)).
years.' 2 ' Against the backdrop of a recent "war on independence"
against EOIR adjudicators, which Professor Legomsky has detailed
elsewhere,' 22 these qualifiers come across as saber rattling and create
suspicion that "subject to the Attorney General's ... control" will be
the operative principle in any system of performance evaluation. 23
A lack of transparency may also generate opposition to EOIR's
new performance evaluation system. In liaison meetings with the
American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), the agency has
deflected questions about what criteria will be used to evaluate
judges and how evaluations will be conducted. EOIR has also
rebuffed requests to provide AILA and other stakeholders with an
opportunity to review and comment on the program. 124 Although an
agency's management directives and procedural rules are exempt
from notice and comment procedures, EOIR has waived this
exemption in the past.125 And EOIR could solicit public input on the
121. Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91
CORNELL L. REv. 369, 374, 379 (2006).
122. Id. at 371-85.
123. Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,673.
124. Executive Office for Immigration Review, AILA-EOIR Agenda
Questions and Answers (2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/eoirailal01806.pdf. Only the slimmest of
details have emerged about the performance evaluation initiative. Former EOIR
Director Rooney has stated that EOIR adjudicator performance will be rated as
"Satisfactory, Improvement Needed, and Unsatisfactory," and that implementation
of the program is subject to statutory bargaining obligations with the IJ union.
Rooney Memo, supra note 117. EOIR's General Counsel has been detailed to a
newly created position of Assistant Chief Immigration Judge for Conduct and
Professionalism, serving in an "acting" capacity. Executive Office for Immigration
Review, AILA-EOIR Liaison Meeting Agenda Questions 2-3 (2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/ statspub/eoiraila041107.pdf. The BIA now reports to
the Office of Chief Immigration Judge instances where Us have failed to display
the appropriate level of professionalism. DOJ's Office of Immigration Litigation
makes a similar report to EOIR's Office of General Counsel when a case pending in
federal court reflects temperament, conduct, or quality problems on the part of an IJ
or BIA member. Rooney Memo, supra note 117.
125. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 7309, 7309-10 (Feb. 19, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts.
3, 280) (soliciting public comment on a proposed rule to "revise the structure and
procedures of the Board of Immigration Appeals, provide for an enhanced case
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design and implementation of performance reviews outside of the
rulemaking process. In light of the significant negative publicity that
has surrounded EOIR adjudication over the past year, it is a poor
tactical choice for the agency to be so close-lipped about its plans
(although it is possible that - despite public statements to the contrary
- this silence might simply reflect a lack of progress on this initiative
due to the current vacuum of leadership at DOJ).126
The opportunity for public input is particularly important given
that EOIR's new regulation promises an evaluation system that will
include a "process for reporting adjudications that reflect
temperament problems or poor decisional quality. ' 127 There is a
reservoir of potential support for a system that deals appropriately
with misconduct by a minority of immigration judges, conduct that
includes (in the words of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals)
"bullying ... brow-beating ... hostility ... abusive treatment," "bias-
laden remarks," and "crude (and cruel)" behavior. 128 Immigration
attorneys have long perceived unfairness in the fact that EOIR
routinely sanctions private attorneys for misconduct, but does
nothing to address serious misbehavior by its own immigration
judges or government attorneys. They might welcome managerial
intervention to deal with the few bad actors but - given the
accompanying risk to decisional independence - must be assured that
the system is operating fairly. Although EOIR cannot discuss
management procedure, and expand the number of cases referred to a single Board
member for disposition").
126. See Pamela A. MacLean, No Sign of Immigration Judge Code of Conduct,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 26, 2007, at 6; Philip Shenon, Interim Heads Increasingly Run
Federal Agencies, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 2007, at Al (reporting that the top three
posts at the Department of Justice are filled by interim officials in an "acting"
capacity).
127. Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg., 53,673,
53,677 (Sept. 20, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1240).
128. Cham v. Attorney Gen., 445 F.3d 683, 686 (3d Cir. 2006). For additional
examples of the "prolific and scathing" criticism of immigration judges coming
from the courts of appeals, see Legomsky, supra note 7, at 420 n.44. These
concerns about the temperament of immigration judges and the quality of their
decisions were widely reported in the press. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Courts
Criticize Judges' Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 2005, at Al;
Pamela A. MacLean, Immigration Bench Plagued by Flaws; Due Process Abuse,
Bad Records Alleged, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 6, 2006, at 1.
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disciplinary action taken against an individual judge, it should be
more forthcoming about the substantive criteria and the procedures it
will use in the new system of performance evaluation.
In sum, I do not believe, as Professor Legomsky seems to suggest
in his response to the Asylum Study, that any system of performance
evaluation is an "especially bad idea."' 29 It is true, however, that "in
the wrong hands, with the wrong attitude, and without constant
vigilance," increased managerial control of EOIR adjudicators "could
cause a serious setback to the system of administrative justice."'' 30
The ACUS study identified several criteria for a system of
performance evaluation that appropriately protects decisional
independence. They include peer review and oversight of the
program from the Office of Personnel Management. 13 1 EOIR would
do well to implement these recommendations and - by opening up its
proposal for public input - to allow others to assess whether the
program is in fact being designed to "fully respect[]"132the role of the
adjudicator.
Administrative law also provides a perspective to evaluate the
more conceptual reform proposals of the Asylum Study. Our primer
on the structure of agency adjudication discloses a fundamental
disconnect between the problem of decisional disparities documented
in the Asylum Study and the solution proposed by the study authors.
Creating an independent agency to insulate immigration judges,
members of the BIA, and their decisions from oversight would
129. Legomsky, supra note 7, at 468-72. Professor Legomsky articulates his
criticism as directed toward "performance reviews that take approval rates into
account and serve as a criterion for retention or promotion." Id. at 469. He later
includes efforts to increase adjudicator productivity within the scope of his analysis
and suggests that any system of evaluation that comes with consequences
significant enough to alter adjudicator behavior will threaten decisional
independence. Id. He does not discuss in this section whether "punishing wayward
adjudicators," which receives his strong disapproval, includes actions against
intemperate and abusive IJs, or how such misconduct can be identified and
redressed in the absence of performance reviews.
130. Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting
memorandum from Robert Trachtenberg, the SSA official who promoted the
controversial targeting of ALJs for quality assurance review, to the Regional Chief
ALJs, setting forth a Regional Office Peer Review Program).
131. Lubbers, supra note 40, at 605.
132. Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,676-77.
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jettison the tools traditionally available to achieve policy control and
greater uniformity of decisions. Simply put, there is no reason to
think that asylum decisions will become more consistent if EOIR
adjudicators become more independent, and some reason to suspect
the opposite would be true.
The authors of the Asylum Study nevertheless recommend
emancipating EOIR from DOJ control to promote other important
values, notably "imbuing [agency adjudicators] with a culture of
professionalism and with the independence necessary to perform
[their] duties impartially."' 3 3 A culture of professionalism springs
from a number of sources, however, and it is perhaps more closely
related to the training, expertise, and sense of mission shared by
adjudicators than it is to their place in the administrative bureaucracy.
The successful creation of the asylum officer corps within the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service aptly illustrates this point.
134
EOIR adjudicators may gain a measure of prestige if they are moved
to an independent agency. But structural reform by itself will not
necessarily improve the judicial demeanor of the intemperate, or
make the slip-shod judge more careful. It will do nothing to change
the fact that there are "too many people who should not be in a
position of judging others, especially those with no power" serving as
immigration judges. 135
This problem of intemperate and abusive IJs should not be
overlooked as we evaluate reform proposals. The concern could
perhaps be addressed with a somewhat counterintuitive idea: the
Attorney General's directive to establish more managerial control
over EOIR adjudicators by instituting performance reviews could be
combined with the Asylum Study's proposal to liberate them from
policy control. Stated differently, EOIR adjudicators could be
separated from DOJ, as the Asylum Study authors recommend, and at
the same time could be subject to greater supervisory oversight from
the head of a newly-independent agency. 136 The Department of
133. Asylum Study, supra note 1, at 386.
134. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
135. This statement was made with reference to ALJs in Koch, supra note 38,
at 275.
136. Although the Asylum Study authors do not address the issue of
performance evaluations and strongly favor reforms that move in the direction of
decisional independence, they make passing reference this idea. Asylum Study,
Justice has so thoroughly undermined the integrity of EOIR
adjudication in recent years that a "divorce" between the two
agencies is perhaps the only route to a healthy bureaucratic culture of
professional adjudication. It is this concern, rather than the problem
of decisional disparities so thoroughly documented in the Asylum
Study, that seems to animate the authors' policy proposals. Moreover,
it is only within such culture, in the absence of mistrust and lingering
tension between agency managers and adjudicators, that management
initiatives to promote consistency and evaluate judicial temperament
and performance can be implemented successfully.
In a perfect world, we might work our way through these vexing
choices in a careful study of the sort that, iropically, used to be
funded by ACUS. (An excellent example is an ACUS-funded study
conducted by David Martin in the late 1980s, which successfully
launched the asylum officer corps.)137 It seems more likely that
Congress or the executive branch will instead lob in a quick "fix" of
the asylum system with potentially disastrous consequences.138
supra note 1, at 333 n.65 (suggesting that data about discrepant grant rates "may be
a jumping off point for a more thorough examination of performance and
professionalism in the courtroom").
137. See Martin, supra note 67. Professor Martin later served as a consultant to
the INS; his work as a consultant forged the compromise that created our current
asylum procedures. See Martin, supra note 31. ACUS also funded earlier studies in
the immigration law arena. See Stephen H. Legomsky, A Research Agenda for
Immigration Law: A Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States,
25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 227 (1988); Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the
Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV.
1297 (1986).
138. Attorney General Ashcroft's "streamlining" of BIA adjudication provides
one example. These procedures had a number of negative spillover effects,
including a dramatic rise in the caseload of the courts of appeals. See Legomsky,
supra note 121, at 375-77; John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth
Cronin, Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals
Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in
Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 56 (2005). A recent near miss was a
proposal from the ombudsman of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to
eliminate asylum officer jurisdiction over any individual who is not in valid
immigration status. This proposal, which would have gutted the current system of
affirmative asylum adjudication, paid absolutely no heed to the years of study that
went into crafting the current procedures. Memorandum from Prakash Khatri,
Ombudsman, Citizenship and Immigration Servs., to Emilio Gonzalez, Dir., U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Servs. (March 20, 2006), available at
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Effective reform is not possible, however, unless we understand the
broader administrative law context and talk frankly about the
tradeoffs inherent in structuring agency adjudication.
http://www.dhs.gov/ xlibrary/assets/ClSOmbudsmanRR 24 AsylumStatus_03-
20-06.pdf. It was promptly rejected by the USCIS Director, who noted that the
recommendation was based on a novel legal interpretation and would, if
implemented, "eliminate a valuable, time-tested process for the vast majority of
asylum applicants." Memorandum from Emilio Gonzalez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Servs., to Prakash Khatri, Ombudsman, Citizenship and
Immigration Servs. (June 20, 2006), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ CISOmbudsmanRR_24 AsylumStatus_
USCISResponse-06-20-06.pdf.
